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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
Despite the many approaches of neoclassical and endogenous growth theory, economists still 
face problems explaining the reasons for income differences between countries. Institutional 
economics and the deep determinants of growth literature try to depart from pure economic 
facts to examine economic development. Therefore, this article analyses the impact of 
institutions, geography and integration on per capita income. Concerning theoretical 
reasoning, emphasis is on the emergence of institutions and their effect on economic growth. 
However, institutions can appear in different shapes since political, legal and economic 
restrictions are not the only constraints on human behaviour. Norms and values also limit 
possible actions. Therefore, a differentiation between formal and informal institutions is 
made. The regression results affirm a crucial role of informal and formal institutions 
concerning economic development.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Despite the many approaches of neoclassical and endogenous growth theory, economists still 
face problems explaining the reasons for income differences between countries. Economic 
growth cannot be solely determined by the conventional factors of production like physical 
and human capital accumulation and technological progress. However, breaking down the 
unknown process of productivity, growth theory has no other choice than to open up to deeper 
determinants of growth that might originate in other disciplines. This is what institutional 
economics does. Although the starting point of all actions remains familiar since human 
interactions are driven by scarcities, incentives and the desire to decrease uncertainty and 
transaction costs, further explanations shift away from pure economics and open up an 
interdisciplinary approach. Political, legal and historical sciences, geography, trade and even 
culture and psychology are considered (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Porta and Scazzieri, 1997; 
Gallup et al., 1998; Frankel and Romer, 1999; Hall and Jones, 1999; La Porta et al., 1999; 
Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2002; Easterly and 
Levine, 2003; Rodrik, 2003; Sachs, 2003; Dollar and Kraay, 2004; Glaeser et al., 2004; La 
Porta et al., 2004; Przeworski, 2004; Rodrik et al., 2004; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; 
Acemoglu et al., 2005; Tabellini, 2005; Guiso et al., 2006; Knowles and Weatherston, 2006; 
Persson and Tabellini, 2006; Fernández and Fogli, 2007; Tabellini, 2007; Fernández, 2008; 
Persson and Tabellini, 2008; Tabellini, 2008; Persson and Tabellini, 2009; Williamson, 2009). 
However, in this article, the emergence of institutions and their impact on economic outcome 
are emphasized. Most of the work on institutions deals with political, judicial and economic, 
and thus formal, institutions. Often the protection of property rights is assumed to be the basic 
institutional feature for economic success. Therefore, the analysis reverts to a property rights 
measure concerning formal institutions. Additionally, culture is emphasized as a crucial 
determinant of economic growth. Culture is defined as the values, norms, habits, conventions, 
codes of conduct, traditions, attitudes and beliefs of a society; and it is equated with the term 
‘informal institutions’. Since informal institutions incorporate beliefs as well as the behaviour 
that implements these beliefs, religion is closely related to them.  
The theoretical argument demonstrates the transmission channels between institutions and per 
capita income and emphasizes the issues of endogeneity and reverse causality. Moreover, a 
regression analysis incorporating informal and formal institutions, geography and trade is run. 
The regression results affirm a crucial role of formal and informal institutions concerning 
economic development.  
 2 
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows: in the second part, formal and informal 
institutions are determined and the interrelations between institutions and per capita income 
are depicted. The third section emphasizes the issue of endogeneity and reverse causality. The 
method of instrumental variable estimation is presented as a possible solution concerning the 
econometric analysis. The fourth part presents the data used in the empirical analysis, which 
incorporates geography and trade variables. Furthermore, the regression approach is depicted. 
Accordingly, the fifth section demonstrates the regression results. The conclusions are 
presented in the last part. 
 
 2. Formal and informal institutions 
 
Institutions constitute the social, political, legal and economic systems of a state. According to 
North (1990), ‘Institutions are the rules of the game in a society ... (they) are the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction. … they structure incentives in human 
exchange, whether political, social or economic’ (p. 1). Hence, institutions are the framework 
within which social life takes place. Without institutions a human’s reaction to a particular 
incentive is unpredictable. No patterns exist that could help to forecast human behaviour. 
Furthermore, misconduct cannot be sanctioned since a difference between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
behaviour is not defined. Therefore, people strive for a situation in which others’ reactions are 
predictable and hence uncertainty and transaction costs can be reduced. To achieve their 
target, humans are prepared to impose constraints on themselves whereby codes of conduct 
emerge that afford reliable expectations and therefore reduce uncertainty. These restrictions 
are called institutions. They are created by human beings to impose binding rules on social 
interactions. Institutions specify how to behave in certain situations and, hence, human actions 
become predictable. Violations are punished and offences against the constraints imply 
particular costs. Thus, uncertainty as well as information, monitoring and enforcement costs 
are reduced. Accordingly, we can think of institutions as a particular legal system, the 
constitution of a state or business regulations. In general, rules that constitute the political, 
legal, economic and social environment and are formally written down in a rule book, be it for 
example a legal text or a constitution, are called formal institutions. On the other hand, life is 
not constrained solely by formal institutions. Morals, norms, values, habits, conventions, 
traditions and codes of conduct also influence human behaviour. These cultural factors are 
called informal institutions. They are not officially written down and a violation must not lead 
to state-run but rather public or societal punishment. Usually informal institutions underlie 
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formal institutions since they determine a society’s basic attitudes and beliefs. Sometimes 
individuals might feel constrained by informal institutions that relate to their conviction rather 
than by formal institutions.  
Much work has been carried out on the issue of formal institutions and their impact on 
economic growth. Clearly, a country’s economic development is determined by its political, 
legal and economic systems. Less is known regarding informal institutions and their effect on 
economic outcome. If societies differ concerning their cultural characteristics, aggregated 
behaviour will vary and thus affect economic outcome differently. Therefore, the following 
section will examine the transmission channels between formal and informal institutions and 
economic growth.  
Informal institutions are defined as values, morals, conventions, norms, habits, traditions, 
codes of conduct, attitudes and beliefs. The corresponding transmission channel is the 
individual her- or himself as informal institutions affect economic development on an 
aggregated level through their influence on people’s behaviour. An early example regarding 
informal institutions and their influence on economic development is Max Weber’s popular 
thesis concerning the Protestant work ethic (Weber, 2002, originally published in 1904-05). 
Weber argues that the emergence of capitalism was closely related to the belief, and hence the 
resulting behaviour, of the Protestant population. Following his argument, work was not just a 
means to an end but the purpose of life and God’s will. People believed that God’s chosen 
ones were pleased with a materially good and safe life. Hence, everybody tried to achieve a 
high living standard in order to believe that she or he was a chosen one. In other societies, 
where material standards play no role regarding God’s goodwill, people lack the accordant 
incentives to work hard and to invest. Therefore, according to Weber, countries with a high 
proportion of Protestant citizens were economically more successful than others.1 
Consequently, beliefs, attitudes and codes of conduct resulting from religious affiliation affect 
the development of economies. Weber’s thesis comes close to this work, as religious origins 
result in norms and values that people implement in everyday life. For now, the religious 
dimension will be skipped but we will refer to this point later. At any rate, the hypothesis 
states that particular informal institutions support factor accumulation and technological 
progress while others do not. The challenge is to measure informal institutions and to point 
out concrete features with which the impact on economic growth can be analysed.  
                                                 
1
 However, Weber’s argument is not without controversy. Becker and Wößmann (2009) state that the economic 
success of the Protestant work ethic depended on the fact that people became better educated since they had to be 
literate to read the Bible. 
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Therefore, the emphasis is on three commonly used informal institutional factors, which will 
also play a role in the empirical analysis to describe the impact of culture on economic 
growth. These factors are trust, control over one’s own life and the societal structure, hence 
limited vs. generalized morality (Platteau, 2000).  
The role of trust in an economy has been studied for some time, especially in game theoretical 
approaches. An individual’s level of trust depends on her or his cultural and societal 
background, as well as on experiences and upbringing. If children are taught to trust other 
people, they will apply what they have learned without critical request, eventually for all their 
life, and will pass their attitudes on to their own children.2 Hence, individuals are taught to 
trust or not to trust affiliates of a certain group (Greif, 1994; Platteau, 2000). Knack and 
Keefer (1997), for example, find out that the level of trust is higher in countries with less 
ethnical and class discrepancy. Hence, in hierarchical societies, where familial or tribal 
affiliation is important, the level of trust within the respective group is high, whereas beyond 
the group individuals do not trust others. Since trust is an informal institution, it is slow-
moving (Roland, 2005). That is to say, the attitudes responsible for an individual’s level of 
trust change slowly and an external alteration is difficult. At any rate, institutions are dynamic 
entities. That is to say, they are continually altered through historical accidents and 
endogenous processes. Logical reasoning, for example, in the course of time, can lead to a 
modification of attitudes, beliefs and world views.  
Trust, however, has several impacts on economic performance. La Porta et al. (1997) find that 
trust increases judicial efficiency, bureaucratic quality and tax compliance, while high levels 
of trust decrease corruption. In high-trust societies, however, information is replaced by trust. 
Hence, the corresponding monitoring expenses decrease. Furthermore, people in high-trust 
societies may not record every detail of an act of sale and spend less time and money on 
lawyers and on the monitoring process. The business environment and, in general, economic 
transactions may be less regulated than in low-trust societies. People in high-trust societies 
put more confidence in the government and other official agencies, which results in higher 
credibility. Therefore, incentives to innovate and to invest are higher. Since transaction costs 
are low, more capital and more time is available for innovation and investment. Additionally, 
investors in a high-trust society will realize the optimal investment strategy over the long run 
rather than the short run. Trust enhances anonymous market exchange and decreases the need 
for external enforcement. That is to say, trust also increases the gains from labour division and 
trade (Putnam, 1993; Knack and Keefer, 1997). 
                                                 
2
 See for example Fernández and Fogli (2007) for the transferability of norms and attitudes from one generation 
to the next and the consequences for economic growth. 
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However, these examples already indicate the ambiguous character of institutional relations 
since an adequate regulatory structure and legal system might also increase the level of trust. 
Higher per capita incomes, however, lead to a general change in perspectives and priorities 
and, hence, modify a society’s level of trust in the long term. Thus, a clear causality between 
trust and the respective formal institutions or rather per capita income does not exist. At any 
rate, it is obvious that a high level of trust decreases transaction costs while it leads to an 
increase in the quantity of transactions. Therefore, trust is associated with higher economic 
growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997; La Porta et al., 1997).  
Another informal institutional feature is an individual’s conviction concerning control over 
one’s own life. If people are persuaded that they are able to influence destiny, they will try to 
improve their situation and be proactive. If, on the other hand, people believe in 
predestination, they are not in a position to better their situation through their own initiative. 
Hence, investment in physical and human capital will in general be lower than in a society in 
which everybody works hard and invests to improve her or his life. The attitude concerning 
control over one’s own life can originate from religious beliefs and cultural background but it 
can also be the result of the formal institutional environment. An authoritarian political 
system that domineers over its citizens combined with bad economic performance, and 
therefore low per capita income, probably does not entail self-confidence but resignation. A 
higher living standard, however, contributes to an attitude of self-determination and self-
confidence. People endued with property would rather maintain that their wealth can be traced 
back to their own decisions and activities. These individuals will also believe that they can 
shape their future according to their own wishes. Of course, wealth can also be traced back to 
destiny, as, for example, in Weber’s thesis on the Protestant work ethic. At any rate, a high 
living standard will be preferred to be traced back to one’s own efforts, and hence will 
encourage further endeavour. Hence, causality is again ambiguous. At any rate, believing in 
predestination rather inhibits growth on an aggregated level. 
The last example for informal institutional influence on individual behaviour and thus 
economic development is the prevalent societal structure, hence generalized or limited 
morality (Platteau, 2000). Of course, this feature is correlated with the former two. Limited 
morality characterizes hierarchical societies in which high levels of trust and cooperation are 
prevalent inside groups like the family, the clan or the tribe. Within the respective group, 
transaction costs are low and business is carried out. However, beyond the group, mistrust is 
dominant and people have less respect for members of other families, clans or tribes. 
Cooperation between members of different groups depends on high monitoring and 
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information costs and, thus, transactions beyond the group are rare. Hence, in societies where 
limited morality is prevalent, innovation, investment, factor accumulation, trade and hence 
economic development per se is restricted through the limited possibilities of cooperation. 
That is to say, a hierarchical society with distinct familial or tribal structures is less supportive 
of economic growth. Societies that emphasize the individual and in which respectful codes of 
behaviour are applied to everyone, independent of familial or tribal affiliation, practise what is 
called generalized morality. This permits an increase in the quantity of cooperation and 
transactions, while lowering costs, and hence supports growth (Greif, 1993; Greif, 1994; 
Platteau, 2000; Tabellini, 2005; Tabellini, 2007; Tabellini, 2008). The impact of the societal 
structure on economic development is studied by Greif (1994). The author explores the 
different development paths of Maghribis and Genoese traders in the late eleventh century. 
According to him, wealth differences can be traced back to differing societal patterns. In 
particular, it is decisive whether the society exhibits a collectivist or an individualist structure. 
Via a one-sided prisoner’s dilemma, Greif demonstrates that the economic success of the 
Genoese, compared with the Maghribis, can be ascribed to their individualist societal order. 
Thus, differences in societal organization can be traced back to distinct cultural affiliations.  
The transition from limited to generalized morality, however, is fluent. Codes of conduct and 
trust decrease with distance. That is to say, even if generalized morality is prevalent within a 
society, limited morality might be practised if we extend the geographical scope (Tabellini, 
2007). Tabellini (2008) argues that limited and generalized morality not only shape economic 
development, but are a matter of the development progress itself. Accordingly, ‘At early 
stages of development, transactions are mainly local, and both values and cooperation remain 
more limited in scope. As development progresses, and impersonal transactions gain 
relevance, this is accompanied by a generalization of the scope of values and cooperation’ (p. 
28). Hence, Tabellini hints at the issue of reverse causality, since societal organization 
influences economic development while economic development impacts on values and beliefs 
and, therefore, societal organization. This is also true for political institutions. Hence, 
generalized morality supports good governance and inter alia (Tabellini, 2007). However, we 
should not rely on the fact that economic development shapes values and beliefs in a way that 
supports generalized morality and, therefore, further progress. The interdependencies between 
economic development and generalized versus limited morality can also lead an economy to 
be stuck in a state of backwardness. Societies that practice limited morality may have less 
respect for the law and may be more tolerant of lax law enforcement, since informal 
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institutions govern their interrelationships. On the other hand, the quality of law enforcement 
may strengthen sound values, beliefs and morals (Tabellini, 2008).  
Regarding formal institutions, the protection of property rights is usually described as the 
decisive institutional feature concerning growth (North, 1990; De Soto, 2000; Platteau, 2000; 
Rodrik, 2007; Kerekes and Williamson, 2008; Williamson and Kerekes, 2009). The 
exclusiveness and the irreproachable allocation of ownership offer the crucial incentive to 
invest that emanates from property rights. That is to say, property rights accord the owner of 
an asset the exclusive rights to decide on the utilization of her or his asset. Therefore, the 
owner will use her or his property in a way that maximizes her or his utility. According to De 
Soto (2000), property rights highlight the economic potential of an asset and, even more 
importantly, assets can be used as collateral. Hence, property can generate new capital and 
receive credit. However, property rights, coupled with an appropriate law to protect them are, 
according to De Soto, the lifeline of economic success in Western economies.  
Despite the direct channel on income, the dominance of secure property rights also makes a 
statement concerning the political and legal environment of a state. Property rights are usually 
not afforded in dictatorships, where expropriation by the political power or even by private 
interest groups is possible since no appropriate law and no independent judiciary exist. Hence, 
unsecure property rights are accompanied by less political and economic freedom, fewer civil 
rights and a manipulable judiciary. The allocation of secure property rights requires an 
independent judiciary that must be able to enforce property rights against governmental and 
private offences. Democracy ensures that formal institutions cannot be changed on behalf of a 
certain interest group that possesses the appropriate resources. Property rights in conjunction 
with civil liberties guarantee the efficient use of every asset in a state, and therefore maximal 
per capita income. Nevertheless, property rights can also exist and be protected in other 
political systems, but since their application will probably be constrained in a non-democratic 
state, total economic efficiency will be adversely affected (Rodrik, 2007; Besley and 
Kudamatsu, 2008). Furthermore, to develop their full potential, ownership rights must be 
accompanied by a free-market system that allows every person to use his or her assets in a 
way that maximizes their individual utility. Then, the economy can realize its maximal growth 
potential on an aggregated level.    
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3. Endogeneity and instrumental variable estimation 
 
Empirical analysis of institutions is particularly hampered by the fact that ‘… institutional 
quality is as endogenous to income levels as anything can possibly be’ (Rodrik, 2007, p. 185).  
Hence, we are talking about a complex institutional system, characterized by 
complementarities and feedback between informal and formal institutions; and between 
institutions and economic development (Williamson, 2000; Roland, 2005; Boettke et al., 
2008; Dolfsma and Verburg, 2008). Higher material security modifies perspectives, priorities 
and the incentives for social affiliation. Hence, informal institutions adjust to new living 
circumstances. Social patterns that subconsciously exist for security reasons and for the 
reduction of transaction costs are no longer necessary when income increases. Attitudes 
concerning individualism, family, society and materialism are altered. However, since 
humans are social beings, several norms and values are maintained, even if they seem useless 
from an economic point of view. That is because individuals need these norms and values for 
self-identification and self-orientation.  
However, radical changes in political and economic institutions are difficult to explain 
without the introduction of informal institutions.3 An increase in per capita income alters 
informal institutions, which in turn impact on formal institutions. The basic settings of a 
society can jointly be responsible for the general concept of the state, the political system and 
the structure of power. An autocratic government and a hierarchic social system, which 
repress parts of the population, may enhance explicit cultural features like disrespect, mistrust, 
resignation, a collective social structure and, hence, limited morality. In turn, these cultural 
characteristics again support the preservation of an authoritarian government and, in general, 
of the prevalent formal institutional structure. An increasing per capita income improves the 
level of informal institutions in the sense that people become more trustful and respectful, 
self-reliant and confident. Apart from that, higher income levels might be correlated with 
higher educational standards, and therefore with more open-minded and educated individuals. 
Hence, due to their higher per capita incomes, the individuals are able to enforce institutions 
that fit their interests. Therefore, people might be rather able to question traditional belief and 
value systems. Consequently, the political system will be challenged. Hence, a democratic 
                                                 
3
 Acemoglu et al. (2005) have developed a theoretical approach that ascribes the emergence of the political, legal 
and economic institutional environment to resource endowment. The essential theoretical feature is the 
differentiation between de jure and de facto political power. Hence, legitimate governance can, but must not 
necessarily, possess de facto political power. Instead, de facto political power depends on resource endowment. 
Thus, an interest group with an adequate endowment of capital and other resources might be able to determine 
formal institutional properties. 
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state supports growth-supporting informal institutions. Independent citizens who can freely 
participate in political, economic and social processes realize a higher level of trust, self-
determination and self-confidence.   
Figures 1 to 5 demonstrate the correlations between our informal institutional measures and 
per capita income.4 However, seemingly growth-supportive attitudes are correlated with high 
income levels, while growth-inhibiting features come along with low income levels. Hence, 
the graphs demonstrate a clear relationship between informal institutions and per capita 
income. Still, no statement concerning causality can be made.   
An increase in per capita income may alter not only informal, but also formal institutions. 
Figure 6 depicts the relationship between per capita income and a measure of formal 
institutions, xconst. The variable is taken from the Polity IV data set and measures the extent 
of institutionalized constraints on the executive. A high level of xconst characterizes growth-
supporting formal institutions, while a low level refers to growth-inhibiting formal 
institutions. In general, low per capita incomes are accompanied by growth-inhibiting formal 
institutions and vice versa. However, some distracting observations with high per capita 
incomes and low institutional values can be observed. These countries are, for example, 
Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates or Qatar, which exhibit relatively high per capita incomes, 
but underperform with respect to their levels of formal institutions. Indeed, these states are 
characterized by features that distinguish them from other countries with growth-supporting 
formal institutions. The mentioned Gulf States, for example, can afford a relatively high 
living standard for their indigenous population due to their oil wealth; therefore, they are able 
to afford ‘bad’ institutions.5 Thus, the positions of these outliers can be traced back to their 
resource wealth.  
The endogeneity and causality issues in institutional analysis depict a particular challenge for 
empirical work. Typically, an OLS regression cannot be run because of a possible omitted 
variable bias and reverse causality. However, the problem of endogeneity in growth empirics 
is commonly solved through instrumental variable estimation – that is, we must find an 
instrumental variable for each of our endogenous regressors. From a methodological point of 
                                                 
4
 The measures are taken from the World Values Survey (World Values Survey Association and European 
Values Study Foundation, 2006) and are called trust, control, respect and obedience. Trust measures the level of 
trust within a society, control indicates how far people are persuaded that they are in control of their lives, 
respect and obedience specify the hierarchical structure of the society, in which high levels of trust, control and 
respect are supportive of growth, while a high level of obedience is growth-inhibiting. Inform4 is a general 
measure of informal institutions and is created by adding up the values of trust, control and respect and by 
subtracting obedience. The subsequent chapter on the data used in the empirical analysis gives a detailed 
description of the informal institutional measures and the indicator inform4. In general, a high level of inform4 
indicates growth-supporting informal institutions, while low levels indicate growth-inhibiting informal 
institutions. 
5
 The term ‘bad’ institutions refers to institutions that are not supportive of economic growth. 
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view, the instrumental variable must provide a convenient source of exogenous variation and 
must not be intuitively correlated with institutions (Rodrik, 2007, p. 185ff.). However, an 
intuitive justification for the use of a certain instrumental variable is desirable, since it will 
help to understand institutional emergence better. 
The following regression analysis uses data on different religious affiliations as instrumental 
variables for informal and formal institutions. Hence, it is assumed that the religious 
environment affects institutions, which then influence per capita income (Weber, 2002; Barro 
and McCleary, 2003; Guiso et al., 2003). Religion cannot directly be correlated with income 
if we want to use it as an instrumental variable. However, just being religious does not affect 
economic outcome. Religion can not achieve anything as long as it is not implemented in 
peoples’ attitudes and behaviour and at least in social, hierarchical and political structures. 
Only then is an indirect influence on income possible. Over decades and centuries, religious 
codes have become a part of the prevalent culture. Although individuals acting according to 
particular cultural norms and values may not connect these features to religion any more, 
tracing the cultural properties back to their origin shows that religion is the starting point.    
The relation between religion and formal institutions can best be seen regarding theocratic 
states where religion claims terrestrial and religious power. However, even in countries where 
state and religious power are separated, a basic attitude arising out of the religious background 
is prevalent. Hence, originally religious beliefs constitute world views and ideologies, that is, 
political ideologies, the general understanding of the state and the societal system per se. Even 
if this is not the case and no general political ideology is prevalent in the society, certain 
cultural traits originating in religion may support a particular political system through 
acquiescence and obedience.  
Figure 7 in the appendix depicts the relationship between the religious affiliation of the 
population and informal institutions. A high Protestant proportion of the population is 
accompanied by high levels of inform4, that is, growth-supporting informal institutions. On 
the other hand, countries with a high proportion of Muslim citizens realize a minor level of 
inform4, and hence have growth-inhibiting informal institutions. However, figure 8 
demonstrates the relationship between religious affiliation and the Freedom House Property 
Rights Index 2000, which is scaled from 0 to 100, with 0 indicating non-protected and 100 
completely protected property rights. A high Protestant proportion of the population is 
attended by a strong protection of property rights, while a high Muslim proportion of the 
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population shows fewer protected property rights.6 However, we use the Protestant and 
Muslim affiliation of the population as instrumental variables for informal and formal 
institutions, respectively. This is the case because we are looking preferably for unequal 
instruments. Since our work is close to that of Max Weber on an argumentative level, 
Protestant affiliation is used to illustrate informal institutions, as Protestantism is said to alter 
norms and values in favour of economic growth. From a Western point of view, the 
differences in formal institutions that can be traced back to religion become particularly 
obvious in Islamic countries. Consider, for example, the political and legal systems, which 
often cannot be described as democratic or constitutional compared with Western standards. 
Hence, to note these differences, the Muslim affiliation of the population is used to illustrate 
formal institutions. That is, Protestant affiliation is assumed to be supportive of economic 
growth, while Muslim affiliation is said to be growth-inhibiting (Landes, 1998; La Porta et 
al., 1999; Guiso et al., 2003). More precisely, Protestantism and Islam are assumed to have 
different impacts on institutional development, and the particular institutions then influence 
the growth rate. These statements will be tested within the empirical analysis. Of course, other 
religions should be considered, too, and thus regressions including the Catholic affiliation of 
the population were run, although the intuitional justification is less clear, as are the empirical 
results. At any rate, since several data sets had to be merged for the empirical analysis, not 
enough observations remained to run regressions with further religious affiliation variables. 
Therefore, our empirical analysis is restricted to proxies for Protestantism and Islam and, for 
the sake of completeness, Catholicism. Since it is expected that Protestantism and Islam, in 
particular, have different effects on institutions, and since both religions are widespread, this 
is not a disadvantage. However, arguing that religion has an influence on the development of 
institutions, we should be clear that we are talking about Protestantism and Islam, and not 
religion in general.   
 
4. Data and regression approach 
 
However, institutions are not the only deep determinant of growth. Of course, geography is a 
further determinant that affects factor accumulation and productivity. It makes a difference 
whether a country has access to the seaside and is located in a temperate climate zone, or 
whether it is embedded in inaccessible terrain and has to cope with climatic extremes like 
droughts and heat or severe rainfall and cold. Moreover, the geographical position determines 
                                                 
6
 In figures 7 and 8, countries with a Protestant, Catholic and Muslim proportion of the population, respectively, 
greater than 50 per cent are used. 
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a country’s resource endowment and is responsible for the disease environment. A further 
deep determinant is integration or, alternatively, trade or openness. As some countries are 
more accessible and easier to reach than others, integration is, of course, influenced by 
geography. Moreover, several connections between integration, institutions and the proximate 
determinants exist, as all the factors influence each other (Rodrik, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004).  
Hence, running a regression analysis with only institutions as independent variables will result 
in biased coefficients, as other deep determinants are omitted. Therefore, geography and 
openness will also be incorporated into the following empirical work.  
In my analysis, I follow Tabellini (2005) and Knowles and Weatherston (2006) with respect 
to their informal institutions index. Using data from the WVS, Tabellini composed an index 
of four cultural features. According to Tabellini: ‘Three of them are expected to encourage a 
positive and productive attitude towards market exchange, entrepreneurial activities, or the 
production of public goods … The fourth indicator is symptomatic of a more hierarchical 
society where individuals are less likely to take advantage of economic opportunities or to 
cooperate with each other …’ (Tabellini, 2005, p. 8ff.). The measures are trust, control, 
respect and obedience.  
In the WVS, trust is measured with the following question: ‘Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’. 
Possible answers are ‘Most people can be trusted’, ‘Can’t be too careful’ and ‘Don’t know’. 
The level of trust in a country is measured by the percentage of respondents who answered 
that ‘Most people can be trusted’.  
The second measure that favours economic development is control. The corresponding 
question in the WVS is: ‘Some people feel that they have completely free choice and control 
over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens 
to them. Please use this scale (from 1 to 10) where 1 means “none at all” and 10 means “a 
great deal” to indicate how much freedom of choice and control in life you have over the way 
your life turns out’. As already explained, being persuaded that one has control over one’s 
own life supports growth and, thus, a high number for control is positively correlated with per 
capita income. To measure control, I follow Knowles and Weatherston (2006), who used the 
percentage of respondents in a country who gave a score of 7-10 concerning the former 
question. 
The last growth-supporting feature is respect. In the WVS, the corresponding question is: 
‘Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do 
you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five.’ Respondents can decide 
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between ‘good manners, independence, obedience, hard work, feeling of responsibility, 
imagination, thrift, saving money and things, determination and perseverance, religious faith, 
unselfishness, and tolerance and respect for other people’. The variable respect is measured as 
the percentage of respondents in each country who mentioned ‘tolerance and respect for other 
people’.  
The fourth element of Tabellini’s cultural indicator is obedience. This factor is not supportive 
of growth as it increases. The appropriate question in the WVS is again the one asking for 
important qualities in children. Hence, obedience is measured by the percentage of 
respondents answering that obedience is an important quality for children to learn. Obedience 
without further reflection is a typical feature of hierarchical societies. Individualism is 
suppressed and obedience is more important than one’s own opinion and personal 
responsibility. The suppression of individualism makes cooperation difficult and has negative 
effects on economic development (Tabellini, 2005). Therefore, respect and obedience are 
used as proxies for the societal structure, resulting in generalized vs. limited morality. 
Accordingly, a country with a high level of respect and a low level of obedience is expected 
to realize generalized morality and vice versa. 
The indicator for informal institutions, inform4, is created by adding up the three positive 
measures minus obedience (Tabellini, 2005; Knowles and Weatherston, 2006). 
A proxy for formal institutions must reflect the interrelationship between formal institutions 
and growth. As already shown, property rights are usually assumed to be the main 
determinant of growth. According to Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) ‘… property rights 
institutions are intimately linked to the distributions of political power in society because they 
regulate the relationship between ordinary private citizens and the politicians or elites with 
access to political power’ (p. 951). I follow Acemoglu and Johnson’s approach and use Polity 
IV’s ‘constraints on the executive’ as a proxy for formal institutions in my regression 
analysis. The variable measures the extent of institutionalized constraints on the executive. Its 
scale ranges from ‘unlimited authority’ (1) to ‘executive parity or subordination’ (7). 
To allow for ecological conditions and geography, I use a measure of malaria risk. The 
variable is called malfal94 and was first introduced by Gallup et al. (1998). It emerged from a 
variable called MAL94P, which depicts ‘… the proportion of each country’s population that 
live with risk of malaria transmission …’ (Sachs, 2003, p. 5). Malfal94 ‘… multiplies the 
MALP94 index by an estimate of the proportion of national malaria cases that involve the 
fatal species, Plasmodium falciparum, as opposed to three largely non-fatal species of the 
malaria pathogen (P. vivax, P. malariae, and P. ovale)’ (Sachs, 2003, p. 5).  
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Openness is measured with data from the Penn World Tables 6.2. I use the variable openk, 
which represents exports plus imports, divided by real GDP per capita in constant prices. The 
base year is 1996. 
The data from the Penn World Tables 6.2 is also used to measure per capita income. The 
corresponding variable is called rgdpl, which represents real GDP per capita in constant 
prices. Again, the reference year is 1996.  
The equation to be estimated is: 
 
(1)  1 2 3 4y I F GEO OPEN= α + β + β + β + β , 
 
where y indicates GDP per capita, I stands for informal and F for formal institutions, GEO 
denotes geography and OPEN is openness.   
Equation (2) corresponds to (1) with only the accordant proxies being inserted: 
 
(2)  1 2 3 4log(rgdpl) inf orm4 xconst malfal94 openk= α + β + β + β + β . 
 
First of all, the equation is estimated via OLS. However, as the causality between institutions 
and per capita income is mutual, endogeneity is definitely an issue in the regression, and 
therefore OLS may not be an accurate estimation method.  
However, the 2SLS method is used to solve the problem of unclear causality between 
institutions and per capita income. Consequently, the other regressors are assumed to be 
exogenous.  
At any rate, after instrumenting for formal and informal institutions, endogeneity could still be 
an issue with respect to geography and integration. Definitely, a higher per capita income 
lowers malaria risk. Better health care is affordable at the state, as well as at the individual, 
level and vaccines are available for major parts of the population. Being aware of this issue, 
Sachs (2003) introduced an instrumental variable called Malaria Ecology (ME), which ‘is 
built upon climatological and vector conditions on a country-by-country basis, and is 
therefore exogenous to public health interventions and economic conditions, [therefore] ME 
provides an ideal instrumental variable for malaria risk’ (Sachs, 2003, p. 7). Hence, ME is 
used as the instrument for malaria risk.  
Concerning openness, it could be argued that richer countries are prone to open their 
economies as they are not protecting infant or other indigenous industries from competition 
on the world market. Hence, openness may lead to higher incomes, but higher incomes may 
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also cause more openness. As in the former malaria case, it reverts to a well-established 
instrumental variable concerning openness, and therefore the natural logarithm of the 
Frankel–Romer actual trade share, logfrankrom, is used (Frankel and Romer, 1999).  
 
5. Regression results 
 
Since the empirical analysis consists of different data sets, the number of included countries 
varies between 72 and 55. 
The first column of Table 1 demonstrates the OLS regression results. A 1 percentage point 
increase in inform4 leads to a 1.1 percentage point increase in per capita income. The result is 
significant at the 1 per cent level. The coefficient on xconst is also significant at the 1 per cent 
level. Accordingly, a 1-score increase leads to a rise in per capita income of 13 per cent. Of 
course, the coefficient on malfal94 has a negative sign as an increase in malaria risk leads to a 
decline in income. Openk is significant at the 5 per cent level and its coefficient is quite small, 
but at any rate a positive effect of openness on income becomes apparent.  
As the size of the coefficients can be misleading concerning the variables’ impact on income 
compared with each other, the first column of Table 2 presents the beta coefficients of the 
OLS regression. When measured in standard deviations, inform4 has the largest effect on per 
capita income compared with all the included variables. Therefore, informal institutions seem 
to play a decisive role in explaining per capita income patterns. 
Columns two and three of Table 1 show the first- and second-stage regressions of a 2SLS 
estimation using protestant as an instrument for informal institutions. The remaining 
independent variables in this regression are assumed to be exogenous. The coefficient on 
protestant in the first-stage regression, which is significant at the 1 per cent level, 
demonstrates the variables’ correlation with inform4, which is a precondition for its use as an 
instrumental variable. The second-stage regression confirms the OLS results. The coefficient 
on inform4 is significant at the 1 per cent level. A 1 percentage point increase in inform4 leads 
to a 1.2 percentage point rise in per capita income. A 1-score increase of xconst on its scale 
from 1 to 7 leads to a 12 per cent higher per capita income. 
Again, the beta coefficients in column three of Table 2 shed some light on the relation of the 
independent variables concerning their impact on per capita income. A 1 standard deviation 
increase in inform4 leads to an increase of 0.49 standard deviations in per capita income. The 
other variables’ beta coefficients are smaller than that. 
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Table 3 demonstrates further 2SLS results. In regression (4), we use protestant and muslim as 
instruments for inform4 and xconst, respectively. Protestant is highly significant in the first 
stage regression on inform4. As expected, muslim is negatively correlated with xconst and 
significant at the 1 per cent level in the first-stage regression on xconst. Hence, a higher 
Protestant affiliation of the population enhances growth-supporting informal institutions, 
while a high Muslim affiliation decreases the level of growth-supporting formal institutions. 
In the second-stage regression, all the variables are significant at least at the 5 per cent level. 
A 1 percentage point increase in inform4 leads to a rise in per capita income of 1.1 percentage 
points. If xconst increases at 1 score, per capita income rises at 17 per cent. A look at the beta 
coefficients of Table 4 again demonstrates the superiority of inform4, which, when rising by 1 
standard deviation, leads to a 0.44 standard deviation increase in per capita income.    
Regression (5) demonstrates the case where we use catholic in place of muslim as an 
instrumental variable. Again, protestant is significant at the 1 per cent level concerning 
inform4. Protestant and catholic are both significant in the first-stage regression on xconst. In 
the second-stage regression, inform4 becomes insignificant, while the coefficient on xconst 
increases.  
Regressions (6)-(8) show the 2SLS results when we use instrumental variables for all the 
independent variables. Thus, regression (6) uses protestant as an instrument for inform4, 
muslim as an instrument for xconst, me as an instrument for malfal94 and logfrankrom as an 
instrument for openk. Regression (7) is consistent with regression (6), but it uses catholic 
instead of muslim as an instrument for xconst. Regression (8) also corresponds to regressions 
(6) and (7), but uses catholic and muslim as instruments for xconst. Hence, regressions (6)-(8) 
differ concerning the instrumental variables that are used to instrument for xconst. Apart from 
that, they are equal. The first-stage regressions for malfal94 and openk are listed in the 
continuation 1 of table 3. At any rate, the instrumental variables me and logfrankrom are 
highly significant in each case.  
In regression (6), muslim is used as instrumental variable for xconst. Now, protestant is only 
significant on inform4, while muslim is significant and negatively correlated with xconst. All 
the regressors of the second-stage regression are significant at least at the 10 per cent level. A 
1 percentage point increase in inform4 leads to a 0.89 percentage point increase in per capita 
income. If xconst rises at 1 score, per capita income increases at 18.4 per cent. Regarding the 
beta coefficients in Table 4, a 1 standard-deviation increase in inform4 leads to a rise in per 
capita income of 0.37 standard deviations, which is nearly the same amount as the beta 
coefficient on xconst. 
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In regression (7), again, catholic is used instead of muslim as an instrumental variable for 
xconst, while all the independent variables are assumed to be endogenous. However, inform4 
is significant at the 10 per cent level. The coefficient on xconst again increases compared with 
regressions (1) and (3), in which muslim is used as instrument, though the increase is not 
excessive. The most notable alteration occurs in the beta-coefficients table, where the 
coefficient on xconst increases to 0.47 standard deviations. Hence, using catholic as an 
instrument for formal institutions, xconst gains more importance regarding its effect on per 
capita income and compared with the other regressors, while inform4 becomes less 
significant. 
Regression (8) is overidentified – that is, protestant, muslim and catholic are used as 
instrumental variables. However, when muslim is incorporated, catholic is not significant in 
the first-stage regression on xconst. Instead, muslim is negatively correlated with xconst and 
significant at the 1 per cent level. Protestant is also significant at the 1 per cent level in the 
first-stage regression on inform4. All the regressors are significant in the second-stage 
regression. A 1 percentage point increase in inform4 leads to a 0.8 percentage point increase 
in per capita income. If xconst increases at 1 score, income rises at 19.6 per cent. Regarding 
the beta coefficients, the coefficient on xconst decreases to 0.37 standard deviations, but is 
still slightly higher than the coefficient on inform4. However, using protestant, muslim and 
catholic as instrumental variables, the disturbing effect of catholic decreases. The coefficients 
on inform4 and xconst are comparable with the ones using only protestant and muslim, and 
thus the overidentified regression can be used as a test of robustness. If catholic has a 
significant effect that disturbs the relationship, the result would not be robust in comparison 
with the ones using protestant and muslim. Thus, the correlation between protestant, muslim, 
xconst and inform4 is stable. At any rate, catholic does not seem to fit into the intuitive 
argument. While Protestantism and Islam seem to have an impact on institutions, this must 
not hold for all religions. 
To assure the results, some tests were conducted in order to shed light on a few issues 
concerning instrumental variable estimation (continuation 2 of table 3). However, the small 
sample size demonstrates a problem regarding 2SLS estimation as well as testing. However, 
as we are working with country data and different data sets, there is nothing we can do about 
that issue. Therefore, the tests can best be seen as additional coverage, but they are not fully 
reliable and have to be considered with caution. Most assumptions and conclusions must be 
considered by relying on intuition.  
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A perpetual issue in empirical work is that of heteroskedasticity. Although heteroskedasticity 
does not affect the consistency of the instrumental variable coefficient estimate, it does affect 
the estimates of the standard errors. Therefore, the Pagan–Hall test was applied to regressions 
4, 5 and 6 to detect possible heteroskedasticity in the 2SLS estimations. The results suggest 
that heteroskedasticity is not existent in the accordant regressions. However, caution is 
advisable concerning this outcome as the Pagan–Hall test statistic might not be useful 
working with small sample sizes (Baum et al., 2003). Therefore, additionally, the White–
Koenker test statistic was used, even though this test is usually not applied in instrumental 
variable estimation. However, again, the result suggests that no heteroskedasticity is 
prevalent.  
Concerning the validity of the instruments, the Sargan test statistic was implemented, again 
only for the case of overidentification, as the test is not valid otherwise. However, the null 
hypothesis is not rejected, and thus the instrumental variables are not correlated with the 
disturbance. Again, we cannot fully rely on the test statistic since the Sargan test may not be 
valid when all the instruments share the same rationale (Murray, 2006). As three religious 
affiliation variables are used as instrumental variables, this is definitely the case, and thus the 
test only affirms our regression results but cannot be seen as evidence. 
Finally, the Shea statistic to test for the issue of instrumental variable irrelevance was applied. 
Again, we achieved a positive result since at least the instruments for institutions are clearly 
relevant. To solve the problem of instrumental variable irrelevance, it is also useful to have a 
look at the first-stage regression results. The relevance is confirmed, since all the instruments 
are highly significant with respect to the accordant endogenous regressors.  
Table 5_1 and table 5_2 demonstrate several tests of robustness. Yet again, regressions (6)-(8) 
were run including further independent variables, respectively. However, Panel A 
incorporates dummy variables for English and French legal origin as additional regressors. 
The original regression results are robust. Again, inform4 becomes insignificant when 
catholic is used as the sole instrumental variable for formal institutions. Moreover, the 
coefficient on malfal94 further decreases. Interestingly, the coefficient on English legal origin 
is significant at the 5 per cent level in all the regressions.  
Panel B includes a measure of population density, pop100km. Again, the original regression 
results are robust with respect to the inclusion of the additional regressors, while pop100km 
itself is insignificant. 
In panels C, D and E, the variables coastline, temperature and landlocked from the Parker 
(1997) data set are added as exogenous regressors. All three factors are insignificant, while 
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the results remain robust. The variables in panel C, D and E depict geography measurements. 
Since they are not significant in contrast to malfal94, panel F examines what happens when 
malfal94 is omitted, that is, when we do not control for geographical or ecological 
determinants at all. Still the results are robust. The main difference is depicted by openk, 
which is significant at the 5 per cent level in all the regressions, and thus there does not seem 
to be a high correlation between malfal94 and our institutional measures. 
The empirical analysis demonstrates that at least Protestantism and Islam have a significant 
influence on the quality of institutions. Accordingly, a high proportion of Protestant 
population accompanies growth-supporting informal institutions, while a high proportion of 
Muslim population is negatively correlated with the constraints on the executive in the 
particular countries. Furthermore, our indicator of informal institutions is positively correlated 
with per capita income. Hence, informal institutions can be growth-supportive or growth-
inhibiting. The higher the levels of trust, control and respect, and the lower the level of 
obedience, so much the better for economic growth. Moreover, our measure of formal 
institutions and malaria risk are significant for per capita income, while openness at least 
becomes insignificant. It can be concluded that a 1 percentage point increase in inform4 leads 
to an increase in per capita income between 0.8 and 1.1 percentage points. If xconst increases 
by 1 unit per capita, income rises by about 20 percentage points.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The article tries to incorporate cultural traits into growth analysis and examines whether the 
emergence of institutions can be traced back to religious origins. The assumption is that not 
only formal but also informal institutions have an impact on economic growth. Theoretical 
and empirical analysis must consider the issues of endogeneity and reverse causality. 
Therefore, the transmission channels between informal and formal institutions and per capita 
income are examined. In the empirical analysis, several 2SLS regressions are run. The 
proportions of the population being, respectively, Protestant or Muslim are used as 
instrumental variables. A high Protestant proportion of the population is correlated with 
growth-supporting informal institutions, while a high percentage of Muslim citizens is 
correlated with growth-inhibiting formal institutions. Moreover, the second-stage regressions 
demonstrate that informal and formal institutions have a crucial impact on per capita income.  
The relevance of this result stems from the particular properties of informal institutions. In 
general, institutions are characterized by their stickiness, and thus alterations take place 
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slowly. Institutions that are responsible in particular for self-identification, that is informal 
institutions, are even more resistant to change (Roland, 2005; Boettke et al., 2008). At the 
same time, these institutions are jointly responsible for economic development and are 
ambiguously correlated with formal institutions and income. Hence, an alteration of formal 
institutions that obviously hinder growth encounters several problems. First, formal and 
informal institutions are correlated, and many formal institutions even originate in informal 
institutions. Therefore, when changing formal institutions, the ambiguous transmission 
channels and the prevalent informal institutions must be considered. Otherwise, the change 
can lead to unexpected results. At the least, the modification could worsen the situation or 
simply have no effect, as the prevalent culture might not match the formal transformations. 
Second, political or economic patterns, which in general are considered to be supportive of 
economic growth, do not do the job in certain countries with different societal and cultural 
origins, and thus some institutions cannot be exogenously modified – that is, the 
transformation of institutions is constrained. Third, no true or right institutional structure 
exists, as the quality of institutions depends on their societal environment. Hence, institutions 
that might be judged as growth-inhibiting in one country can be quite effective somewhere 
else. This holds for formal as well as informal institutions. 
Of course, this means that a general pattern of growth that can be applied to every country 
does not exist. Although this conclusion might be depressing because it limits the scope for 
development economics, it has important political implications in that the implementation of 
standard Western institutions might not be helpful in certain cases. Thus, in the majority of 
cases, externally imposed institutions that are not rooted in the historical and cultural 
environment will not be accepted. 
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Table 1 
 OLS Regression: 
Dependent 
Variable is GDP 
Per Capita 2000 
2SLS Regression: 
First-Stage 
Regression for 
inform4 
2SLS Regression: 
Second-Stage 
Regression for 
logrgdpl 
 logrgdpl inform4 logrgdpl 
inform4 0.0109712*** 
(0.0019954) 
 0.012326*** 
(0.0033731) 
xconst 0.1301642*** 
(0.0388388) 
3.182979* 
(1.886719) 
0.1218325*** 
(0.0437352) 
malfal94 -1.216108*** 
(0.2801185) 
-46.61603*** 
(13.02763) 
-1.158406*** 
(0.3064585) 
openk 0.0031212** 
(0.0011989) 
0.013975 
(0.0585996) 
0.003085** 
(0.0012155) 
protestant  0.8527801*** 
(0.139111) 
 
N 73 72 72 
R-sq 0.6989 0.5417 0.6972 
adj. R-sq 0.6812 0.5143 0.6792 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Table 2 
Beta Coefficients 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS Regression: 
Dependent 
Variable is GDP 
Per Capita 2000 
2SLS Regression: 
First-Stage 
Regression for 
inform4 
2SLS Regression: 
Second-Stage 
Regression for 
logrgdpl 
 logrgdpl inform4 logrgdpl 
inform4 0.431*** 
(0.00200) 
 0.485*** 
(0.00337) 
xconst 0.254*** 
(0.0388) 
0.157* 
(1.887) 
0.236*** 
(0.0437) 
malfal94 -0.326*** 
(0.280) 
-0.318*** 
(13.03) 
-0.310*** 
(0.306) 
openk 0.176** 
(0.00120) 
0.020 
(0.0586) 
0.173** 
(0.00122) 
protestant  0.540*** 
(0.139) 
 
N 73 72 72 
R-sq 0.699 0.542 0.697 
adj. R-sq 0.681 0.514 0.679 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 3 
Second-Stage Regression: Dependent Variable is log GDP per capita 2000 
 (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 logrgdpl logrgdpl logrgdpl logrgdpl logrgdpl 
inform4 0.0110657*** 
(0.0039334) 
0.0060033 
(0.0048982) 
0.0088514** 
(0.0036032) 
0.0074439* 
(0.0038851) 
0.0083195** 
(0.0035529) 
xconst 0.1701662** 
(0.0749776) 
0.364313*** 
(0.114528) 
0.1843526** 
(0.0789653) 
0.2490486** 
(0.1073546) 
0.1958257** 
(0.0779052) 
malfal94 -1.116845*** 
(0.3076477) 
-0.949904** 
(0.3873074) 
-1.67678*** 
(0.4386155) 
-1.60776*** 
(0.4660777) 
-1.66728*** 
(0.4399537) 
openk 0.0031156** 
(0.0012227) 
0.0032386** 
(0.0014964) 
0.0037304* 
(0.0020363) 
0.0039139* 
(0.0021822) 
0.0034932* 
(0.0020212) 
N 72 72 55 55 55 
R-sq 0.6942 0.5419 0.7479 0.7231 0.7461 
adj. R-sq 0.6760 0.5145 0.7277 0.7010 0.7258 
First-Stage Regression for inform4 
 inform4 inform4 inform4 Inform4 inform4 
protestant 0.8670299*** 
(0.134401) 
0.950064*** 
(0.1366442) 
0.958102*** 
(.1652765) 
1.073868*** 
(0.1708423) 
0.873540*** 
(0.1932181) 
muslim -0.1786212** 
(0.0915166) 
 -0.2148313* 
(0.112025) 
 -0.292980** 
(0.1450689) 
catholic  0.058028 
(0.0822803) 
 0.0567608 
(0.1061688) 
-0.1132904 
(0.1330707) 
malfal94 -52.37387*** 
(12.24637) 
-53.1000*** 
(12.56179) 
   
me   -2.828471** 
(1.102847) 
-2.940639** 
(1.150023) 
-2.95732** 
(1.116203) 
openk -0.005205 
(0.0589431) 
0.0149562 
(0.0596696) 
   
logfrankrom   1.613699 
(4.889369) 
0.9411052 
(5.038896) 
1.871671 
(4.912235) 
R-sq 0.5479 0.5257 0.5421 0.5112 0.5487 
adj. R-sq 0.5209 0.4974 0.5054 0.4721 0.5027 
First-Stage Regression for xconst 
 xconst xconst xconst xconst xconst 
protestant 0.0132785* 
(0.0067509) 
0.031027*** 
(0.007739) 
0.009939 
(0.0076016) 
0.031890*** 
(0.0090671) 
0.0109815 
(0.0089475) 
muslim -0.031136*** 
(0.0045969) 
 -0.03154*** 
(0.0051524) 
 -0.03058*** 
(0.0067178) 
catholic  0.019568*** 
(0.00466) 
 0.019145*** 
(0.0056347) 
0.0013966 
(0.0061622) 
malfal94 -2.011171*** 
(0.6151319) 
-2.02049*** 
(0.7114536) 
   
me   -0.0992628* 
(0.0507237) 
-0.0959334 
(0.0610348) 
-0.0976744* 
(0.0516891) 
openk -0.0034739 
(0.0029607) 
0.0003524 
(0.0033795) 
   
logfrankrom   0.0731941 
(0.2248785) 
-0.0271093 
(0.2674277) 
0.0700139 
(0.2274758) 
R-sq 0.5312 0.3748 0.5268 0.3274 0.5273 
adj. R-sq 0.5032 0.3375 0.4889 0.2735 0.4790 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Continuation 1 Table 3: 
First-Stage Regressions for malfal94 and openk 
 (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
First-Stage Regression for malfal94 
 malfal94 malfal94 malfal94 malfal94 malfal94 
protestant   -0.0002708 
(0.0011411) 
-0.0004137 
(0.0011435) 
-0.0000772 
(0.0013427) 
muslim   0.0003133 
(0.0007734) 
 0.0004921 
(0.0010081) 
catholic    -0.0000263 
(0.0007106) 
0.0002593 
(0.0009247) 
malfal94      
me   0.049746*** 
(0.007614) 
0.050013*** 
(0.0076972) 
0.050041*** 
(0.0077568) 
openk      
logfrankrom   -0.061459** 
(0.0337559) 
-0.0604866* 
(0.033726) 
-0.0620498* 
(0.0341363) 
N     55 
R-sq   0.4954 0.4937 0.4962 
adj. R-sq   0.4550 0.4532 0.4448 
First-Stage Regression for openk 
 openk openk openk openk openk 
protestant   -0.0804346 
(0.2505681) 
0.0717136 
(0.2570871) 
-0.1952616 
(0.2933571) 
muslim   -0.284334 
(0.1698359) 
 -0.3904517* 
(0.2202536) 
catholic    0.0727887 
(0.159765) 
-0.1538373 
(0.2020371) 
malfal94      
me   4.285681** 
(1.671976) 
4.132947** 
(1.730579) 
4.110717** 
(1.694697) 
openk      
logfrankrom   39.49943*** 
(7.412546) 
38.60958*** 
(7.582637) 
39.84973*** 
(7.458096) 
N      
R-sq   0.4151 0.3849 0.4219 
adj. R-sq   0.3683 0.3357 0.3630 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Continuation 2 Table 3: 
Tests 
 (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
First-stage 
F-value 
(inform4) 
  14.80 13.07 11.92 
First-stage 
F-value 
(xconst) 
  13.91 6.08 10.93 
Partial R-
squared 
(inform4) 
  0.5421 0.5112 0.5487 
Partial R-
squared 
(xconst) 
  0.5268 0.3274 0.5273 
Shea 
Partial R-
squared 
(inform4) 
  0.3593 0.3394 0.3721 
Shea 
Partial R-
squared 
(xconst) 
  0.3122 0.1855 0.3229 
Pagan–Hall 
(p-value) 
  0.1592 0.1486 0.1170 
Sargan 
(p-value) 
    0.40526 
White–Koen. 
(p-value) 
  0.0715 0.0913 0.0640 
 
 
Table 4 
Beta Coefficients 
Second-Stage Regression: Dependent Variable is log GDP per capita 2000 
 (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 logrgdpl logrgdpl logrgdpl logrgdpl logrgdpl 
inform4 0.435*** 
(0.00393) 
0.236 
(0.00490) 
0.367** 
(0.00360) 
0.308* 
(0.00389) 
0.345** 
(0.00355) 
xconst 0.330** 
(0.0750) 
0.706*** 
(0.115) 
0.345** 
(0.0790) 
0.467** 
(0.107) 
0.367** 
(0.0779) 
malfal94 -0.299*** 
(0.308) 
-0.254** 
(0.387) 
-0.457*** 
(0.439) 
-0.438*** 
(0.466) 
-0.454*** 
(0.440) 
openk 0.175** 
 (0.00122) 
0.182** 
(0.00150) 
0.207* 
(0.00204) 
0.217* 
(0.00218) 
0.194* 
(0.00202) 
N 72 72 55 55 55 
R-sq 0.694 0.542 0.748 0.723 0.746 
adj. R-sq 0.676 0.515 0.728 0.701 0.726 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35 
Table 5_1 
Panel A 
 (6) (7) (8) 
 logrgdpl logrgdpl logrgdpl 
inform4 0.0094889** 
(0.0045785) 
0.0075245 
(0.0050173) 
0.0087682* 
(0.0044858) 
xconst 0.1945928** 
(0.0819317) 
0.2846951** 
(0.1116936) 
0.203846** 
(0.0805763) 
malfal94 -2.228658*** 
(0.5376502) 
-2.152575*** 
(0.579737) 
-2.183146*** 
(0.529676) 
openk 0.0043812** 
(0.00216) 
0.0046514* 
(0.0023407) 
0.0041055* 
(0.0020983) 
english 0.6565551** 
(0.2660942) 
0.6754848** 
(0.2893617) 
0.6219092** 
(0.2613492) 
french 0.2283765 
(0.2455269) 
0.2316959 
(0.2653676) 
0.1969592 
(0.2411923) 
N 55 55 55 
R-sq 0.7418 0.6990 0.7482 
adj. R-sq 0.7095 0.6614 0.7168 
 
Panel B 
 (6) (7) (8) 
 logrgdpl logrgdpl logrgdpl 
inform4 0.008841** 
(0.0036417) 
0.0075162* 
(0.0039005) 
0.0082946** 
(0.0035883) 
xconst 0.1838067** 
(0.0809815) 
0.2504497** 
(0.1111879) 
0.1952384** 
(0.0799616) 
malfal94 -1.674253*** 
(0.4522285) 
-1.620561*** 
(0.4793294) 
-1.665716*** 
(0.4536114) 
openk 0.0037066* 
(0.0021968) 
0.0040206 
(0.0024029) 
0.0034688 
(0.0021836) 
pop100km 0.0134323 
(0.2512838) 
-0.061855 
(0.2870537) 
0.0233186 
(0.2518145) 
N 55 55 55 
R-sq 0.7483 0.7214 0.7466 
adj. R-sq 0.7226 0.6930 0.7207 
 
Panel C 
 (6) (7) (8) 
 logrgdpl logrgdpl logrgdpl 
inform4 0.0087755** 
(0.0037577) 
0.0074503* 
(0.0040522) 
0.0083239** 
(0.0037303) 
xconst 0.1825715** 
(0.08044) 
0.2490132** 
(0.107262) 
0.1949644** 
(0.0793047) 
malfal94 -1.694253*** 
(0.4687028) 
-1.607031*** 
(0.4981968) 
-1.674253*** 
(0.4695803) 
openk 0.0039155* 
(0.0020308) 
0.0039045* 
(0.0021287) 
0.0037504* 
(0.0020275) 
coastline 1.11e-06 
(7.01e-06) 
-5.41e-08 
(7.48e-06) 
1.02e-06 
(7.04e-06) 
N 55 55 55 
R-sq 0.7483 0.7232 0.7467 
adj. R-sq 0.7227 0.6949 0.7209 
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Table 5_2 
Panel D 
 (6) (7) (8) 
 logrgdpl logrgdpl logrgdpl 
inform4 0.00891** 
(0.0035609) 
0.0076644* 
(0.0038069) 
0.0084437** 
(0.0035162) 
xconst 0.1734568** 
(0.0784331) 
0.2311892** 
(0.1061646) 
0.1836091** 
(0.0774783) 
malfal94 -1.704199*** 
(0.4393179) 
-1.641676*** 
(0.4643527) 
-1.701954*** 
(0.4414064) 
openk 0.4393179 
(0.0019907) 
0.0032403 
(0.002126) 
0.0028494 
(0.0019823) 
landlocked 0.3485095 
(0.2550788) 
0.3279966 
(0.2661393) 
0.3469645 
(0.2562887) 
N 55 55 55 
R-sq 0.7588 0.7403 0.7565 
adj. R-sq 0.7342 0.7138 0.7316 
 
Panel E 
 (6) (7) (8) 
 logrgdpl logrgdpl logrgdpl 
inform4 0.0115617** 
(0.0052573) 
0.0108259* 
(0.0054342) 
0.0106079** 
(0.0050568) 
xconst 0.1886492** 
(0.0842191) 
0.2597326** 
(0.1190618) 
0.2002203** 
(0.0819711) 
malfal94 -1.902622*** 
(0.5216246) 
-1.893423*** 
(0.5522283) 
-1.86252*** 
(0.5131576) 
openk 0.0039582* 
(0.0022113) 
0.0042222* 
(0.00243) 
0.0036705* 
(0.0021558) 
temperature 0.0232571 
(0.0238961) 
0.0299827 
(0.0282988) 
0.0201449 
(0.0232954) 
N 55 55 55 
R-sq 0.7185 0.6833 0.7249 
adj. R-sq 0.6898 0.6509 0.6969 
 
Panel F 
 (6) (7) (8) 
 logrgdpl logrgdpl logrgdpl 
inform4 0.0097821** 
(0.0042433) 
0.0074649 
(0.0046714) 
0.0089669** 
(0.0041732) 
xconst 0.2011776** 
(0.0942365) 
0.3036175** 
(0.1273722) 
0.2230783** 
(0.0919103) 
openk 0.0067656** 
(0.002712) 
0.006862** 
(0.0028934) 
0.0061272** 
(0.0026432) 
N 56 56 56 
R-sq 0.6325 0.5886 0.6319 
adj. R-sq 0.6113 0.5649 0.6106 
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Data Definitions and Sources 
 
control Percentage of respondents who chose a score of 7-10 in response to the 
question ‘Some people feel they have completely free choice and control 
over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect 
on what happens to them. Please use this scale were 1 means “none at all” 
and 10 means “a great deal” to indicate how much freedom of choice and 
control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.’ Accessed at 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org on October 27, 2009. 
trust Percentage of respondents who answer that ‘Most people can be trusted’ to 
the question ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?’ (other 
possible answers are ‘Can’t be too careful’ and ‘Don’t know’). Accessed at 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org on October 27, 2009. 
respect Percentage of respondents who mention ‘Tolerance and respect for other 
people’ when asked the following question: ‘Here is a list of child qualities 
that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you 
consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five.’ Possible 
answers are: ‘Independence, hard work, feeling of responsibility, 
imagination, tolerance and respect for other people, thrift, saving money and 
things, determination and perseverance, religious faith, unselfishness, 
obedience.’ Accessed at www.worldvaluessurvey.org on October 27, 2009. 
obedience Percentage of respondents who mention ‘Obedience’ when asked the 
following question: ‘Here is a list of child qualities that children can be 
encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially 
important? Please choose up to five.’ Possible answers are: ‘Independence, 
hard work, feeling of responsibility, imagination, tolerance and respect for 
other people, thrift, saving money and things, determination and 
perseverance, religious faith, unselfishness, obedience.’ Accessed at 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org on October 27, 2009. 
inform4  Sum of trust, respect and control minus obedience. 
xconst Extent of institutionalized constraints on the executive. The variable ranges 
from a score of (1) ‘Unlimited authority’ to (7) ‘Executive parity or 
subordination’. Source: Jaggers and Marshall (2005); accessed at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm on October 27, 2009.  
malfal94 Proportion of each country’s population that live with the risk of malaria 
transmission multiplied by an estimate of the proportion of malaria cases 
that involve Plasmodium falciparum. Source: Sachs (2003); accessed at 
http://www.earth.columbia.edu/articles/view/1040 on October 27, 2009.  
openk Exports plus imports divided by rgdpl. Source: Heston et al. (2006); 
accessed at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ on October 27, 2009.  
rgdpl Real GDP per capita (Laspeyres). Source: Heston et al. (2006); accessed at 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ on October 27, 2009. 
me  Instrumental variable for malaria risk. Source: Sachs (2003); accessed at 
http://www.earth.columbia.edu/articles/view/1040 on October 27, 2009.   
logfrankrom Natural logarithm of the Frankel–Romer predicted trade share. Source: Hall 
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